Sometimes it is useful to take a step back from posturing and argumentation to assess whether what one is arguing actually makes sense any longer. In the heat of an argument it is not unusual to continue ranting and pursuing heated and entrenched positions even after the basis for those positions has been thoroughly discredited.
Witness current relations between the US and Iran. US Secretary of State, Clinton recently met with Russian President Medvedev in an attempt to get the Russians to endorse sanctions if Iran failed to satisfy US demands that it does not intend to use its nuclear research capability to develop nuclear weapons. This diplomatic ploy was rejected by Medvedev and by Russian Prime Minister Putin as “premature” in light of ongoing negotiations and signs of Iranian cooperation. The US approach could fairly be interpreted of a continuation of the George W. Bush strategy of bluster and threat diplomacy: “Do what I tell you to do or face aggressive punitive actions against you.” It is not really unpredictable that the Russians would reject that approach. The question to be asked is whether the Russian rebuff was really a rebuke or simply a wake up slap on the cheek.
Consider the current circumstances. Iran is struggling to maintain control of Ahmadinajad as the legitimate head of state, after an election that yielded massive protests and claims of fraud and vote rigging. Iran just suffered another suicide attack against its Revolutionary Guard leadership in its southeastern region, the Sistan-Baluchistan province, presumably by an insurgent Sunni group. These signs of internal struggle suggest that Iran has more pressing issues at the moment than developing nuclear weapons to threaten its neighbors. It is not very likely that Iran would be developing such weapons for use inside Iran against insurgent forces or protesters.
Consider also that Russia has more to lose directly from Iran achieving nuclear capability than does the US. Given geographic and geopolitical realities, Iranian support of rebel factions in the former Soviet states of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, and the risk of international warfare in the region are a greater direct threat to Russia than to the US. Of course, both superpowers have “interests” in the area. But the point is that there is little reason to believe that Russia has not taken a carefully considered stand regarding its positions on threatening sanctions against Iran. Although it has not yet complied, Iran has apparently promised to allow International inspection of its facilities and has agreed to send plutonium from its research program to Russia for refinement. This latter concession of sovereignty could be viewed as a gesture of good faith by the Iranian government by anyone unbiased enough to accept such a gesture.
Finally, consider the position that the US is pursuing. It is generally agreed that Iran does not currently have nuclear weapons or the ability to effectively make them. Iran’s government has stated that it does not plan to develop such weapons, though it reserves the right of any sovereign nation to decide whether to do so in the future. Russia and the international community are in negotiations with Iran regarding international concerns about nuclear development for peaceful purposes in Iran. The great majority of nations agree that Iran cannot be precluded from developing nuclear capability for peaceful purposes, such as electricity generation for commercial production and consumer uses. However, the position of the US is to demand measures [as yet unclearly stated] that satisfy the US that Iran does not really have intentions of developing nuclear weapons at some point in the future.
The US demands could be viewed as not only unreasonable, but unduly paranoid. If the shoe were on the other foot, would the US be prepared to satisfy Iran that the US has no intention of unfairly exploiting oil reserves in Iran’s region or that the US does not intend to engage in covert activities to destabilize and overthrow the current Iranian government? Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the US is not already engaged in such activities, it is pretty clear that the US would never agree to accept whatever demands Iran might make to satisfy itself that such threats would not occur in the future. How reasonable then, when one steps back, is the US position in the current context. The current approach appears driven by political, and some would say racist, desires by the US government to demonize Iran. Of course, to even consider such an argument would entail respecting Iran as a sovereign nation. It requires acceptance of the idea that a nation has a right to self determination, even when its policies or philosophy does not hew to the desires of the US government.
The lesson from Iraq, and the philosophy espoused by President Obama when campaigning for office, was that diplomacy should be given an opportunity to work, and reasonable measures must be exhausted before engaging in threats and gunboat diplomacy. It is an open question why that philosophy is not being pursued by Obama in the current circumstances toward Iran.
There is undoubtedly time to intervene in Iran if diplomacy fails and there is actual evidence of Iranian action to manufacture nuclear weapons [or otherwise develop Nuclear weapons capability]. Given that objective reality, the Russian rejection of the US position seems both prudent and wise. If cooler heads exist inside the Obama Administration, they should counsel that Obama return to the philosophy that he espoused in seeking a mandate from the electorate and refrain from hysterical tactics that are likely only to remind the international community of the reasons his predecessor failed.
