"Squandering" in Iraq

Pundits and spinmeisters are fond of tossing around rhetoric about the United States’ “mission” in Iraq. Setting aside for the moment the problem of defining precisely what that “mission” is in light of developments and present circumstances, the rhetoric obscures some more fundamental issues. The term “squandered” is a prime example. Supporters of the Bush administration in Congress argue that the lives of more than 2500 US military personnel would be “squandered” if the US were to adopt a strategy and plan to exit Iraq before the “mission” is accomplished. Such use of the term is neither apposite nor useful.

In the first instance, no loss of life in an unnecessary military intervention is justified. Whether or not the US invasion of Iraq is deemed “illegal” in the context of international law, there is consensus that it was not essential or necessary. There were no weapons of mass destruction, and Iraq presented no imminent threat to the United States or any of its allies. If the term “squandered” is intended to suggest that the loss of lives of US military personnel has been trivialized, then the responsibility for that act of squandering must be laid at the doorstep of the White House, where the order to place them in harm’s way was issued. The argument that more lives must be sacrificed in a dubious and unfocused mission in order to validate the lives lost is absurd and disrespectful. If there is a defined objective that is vital to the US interests and requires military force to achieve, then continuing to place soldiers in harms way may be justified. But the use of precious lives that have already been lost to justify the loss of still more lives is cynical and reprehensible.

In contrast, an appropriate use of the term “squandered” would be in connection with the irresponsible and unnecessary waste of US stature and credibility as a result of the administration and US military handling of reports of incidents of misconduct by US forces. Events that would otherwise be viewed as positive developments in Iraq are marred by questions that continually arise about the conduct of coalition forces. More importantly, the US is powerless to put those questions to rest because it lacks any credibility. The death of Zarqawi is a good example. Initial reports that he was killed in a bombing raid represented a positive development that a major leader in the Al Qaida led forces in Iraq has been taken out or “eliminated.” Later eyewitness reports revealed that Zarqawi did not die immediately from the bomb blasts. An eyewitness reported that he saw US and coalition forces beating a man that closely resembled Zarqawi by stomping on his chest and striking him with rifle butts until blood came out of his nose and ears. The US was required to backtrack and disclose that the Al Qaida leader did not in fact die immediately from the bomb blast, but that he had in fact been in custody and alive. Revised reports from US military spokesmen stated that the coalition forces were trying to “provide medical attention” to Zarqawi and to clear a breathing passage when he expired. The US military promptly dispatched a medical team to perform a US controlled autopsy of the body to “determine the cause of death.”

The subsequent autopsy did little to resolve the cloud of suspicion surrounding the final minutes of Zarqawi’s life. The US officials declared that he died of “massive trauma to his lungs.” That analysis is equally consistent with trauma from the bomb blast as with blunt force trauma of the type described by the eyewitness. Which version is accurate will probably never be known, absent an independent investigation involving sworn testimony by the coalition personnel present at the scene. That is extremely unlikely to happen. One would hope that the coalition forces acted humanely and made sincere attempts to take Zarqawi prisoner, rather than “finish him off.” In any event, this confusion derives from the many instances in which the US military forces and US led coalition forces have been involved in abusive and inhumane conduct, including executions, torture and mistreatment of detainees and civilians. More to the point, the repeated attempt to cover up and failure to hold commanding officers accountable for misconduct that has been established leaves the US with no credibility in responding to or defending the actions of its forces.

If there is any truth to the professed “mission” of the Bush administration, or at least one version of that mission, that the invasion was necessary to deliver the Iraqi people from a brutal and inhumane regime of Saddam Hussein and install a democratic government that would provide stability and progress for the Iraqi people, that “mission” is seriously undermined by the failure of top US military leaders to control and discipline its forces. That mission would be dependent upon garnering the trust and support of the Iraqi people in the objectives. What we now see is a large majority [reportedly in excess of 70%] of Iraqi people who want the US out of Iraq as soon as possible. The frequently stated reason is that the present chaos and civil war is worse for the Iraqi people than their condition under the Saddam Hussein regime. Many in the US, particularly hard-core Bush supporters firmly believe that Iraq is better off after the regime change. However, the critical factor is whether Iraqis believe that to be the case. The only realistic prospect of winning that belief and confidence is to begin to address the situation in Iraq honestly and responsibly, rather than through propaganda, rhetoric and dissembling. Whether the Bush administration and its cadre of media apologists are capable of this task remains an open question.