Waste Not, Want Not

Two interesting reports came out recently regarding the expenditure of funds in Iraq to rebuild infrastructure. Neither report reflects very well on the US management of the process. In a report by the French Press [wonder why it did not get equal play in the US media] the recent audit report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq found that as much as 1/3 of the money on a $900 Million government contract has been wasted. Projects were started and never finished. Some projects were partially built and then handed over to the Interim Government of Iraq, which abandoned them as neither needed or wanted. And projects that were completed were done with such poor construction quality that they are marginally useful. This is but one of the many contracts in which waste and fraud were revealed.

The second report revealed that the Iraq government is spending less than the US government on reconstruction projects. The Iraqi budget surplus continues to rise while the US fiscal situation worsens and falls deeper into deficit. The rise in the Iraqi revenues from oil is understandable due to the rise in the market price of crude oil. Even with reduced production capacity because of the US invasion and resulting conflict, Iraq still produces large quantities of oil for export. The question is why the US continues to pump money from its strained economy for projects that are inherently the responsibility and in the interest of the Iraq government and people.

This suggests a continuation of a chronic problem of US officials failing to adequately consult with Iraqis concerning their needs and desires regarding the governance and operation of their country. Far too often, the Bush administration has proceeded with projects and initiatives with the idea that they were going to "rebuild Iraq in the image of America" and that the US government knows what is best for the Iraqi people. Such arrogance and ignorance easily led to the wasted expenditure of millions of dollars for projects that Iraqis never requested and never wanted.

The US may have some obligation to help the Iraqi government and its people rebuild the thousands of buildings bombed during the "Shock and Awe" invasion. Colin Powell declared, before leaving his post as Secretary of State, that the US was responsible for reconstruction based upon the ethical principle,“you break it, you fix it.” However, much of the resulting destruction and degradation of government buildings and infrastructure was from Iraqi looting. At best, then, the responsibility should be shared. However, if the current mission of the US in Iraq is to stabilize the country so that it can establish democratic self governance, then US expenditures ought to be limited to security and technical assistance.

This latter point has two elements that both favor greater Iraqi involvement. Experts have observed that one of the greatest barriers to stabilization of Iraq is the rate of unemployment. The invasion put many businesses and government agencies out of operation. The looting and anarchy resulting from the invasion and subsequent discharge of the police and security forces disabled even more businesses. Add the immediate unemployment of hundreds of thousands because of the US ordered “De-Baathification,” the firing of all employees who were associated with the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein. These misguided actions by the US run Coalition Provisional Authority raised the rate of unemployment to more than 40% and fueled resentment against the US that greatly increased the ranks of the insurgency. Thus, involving Iraqis more in the planning and actual construction of infrastructure projects to benefit the Iraqi people would reduce unemployment and build goodwill toward the US. Most construction work involves a great deal of manual labor led and directed by a few specialists. The US could supply the special expertise needed and apprentice many Iraqis to do the majority of the actual work.

The second element is that the Iraqi people are more likely to take pride in and to protect projects that are built with Iraqi money and which the Iraqi people have requested. One of the difficulties faced by US contractor construction crews is security and attacks by insurgency groups. Logically, an anti-US Iraqi is not going to think twice about destroying a facility built by Americans with US money. If, on the other hand, the project is being built by Iraqis with Iraqi money and supplying paycheck for hundreds of Iraqi families, there might be more reluctance to attack or damage the facility. Regardless of internal factional differences among Iraqis, there is a distinct difference between a facility constructed by and for the forces of occupation than a facility constructed specifically for the benefit of Iraqis. And just possibly, the Iraqis might do a better job of managing the expenditure of funds coming from their own pockets than the US has been doing. Certainly, they could not do much worse.